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White v. National Football League,
822 F.Supp. 1389 (D. MINN. 1993).
Introduction
Several National Football League players filed timely objections to a
settlement agreement between plaintiffs (White) and defendants (National
Football League). The objectors alleged that the plaintiffs did not adequately
represent their interests and that various provisions of the settlement agreement
violated antitrust laws. The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota overruled all objections and held that the settlement agreement was
fair, reasonable, and adequate to the entire class.
Facts
The relevant facts in this case are best understood in light of the much
publicized case, McNeil v. National Football League.' Freeman McNeil was a
professional football player for the New York Jets. He and seven other football
players, whose contracts expired on February 1, 1990, brought a class action suit
against the National Football League ("NFL") alleging that the NFL's right of
first refusal/compensation component of Plan B violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.2 On February 1, 1989, the NFL, without the consent of
the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA"), had imposed a
new system of player restraints called "Plan B." One component to Plan B
controlled the system of free agency within the NFL. Under this component,
unsigned veteran players who received offers from other NFL teams were subject
to a right of first refusal by their current employers. Additionally, if a player did
eventually sign with another NFL team, then that team was required to
compensate the former team by giving it two first round draft picks. The McNeil
plaintiffs claimed that the magnitude of this compensation scheme inhibited NFL
teams from actively pursuing free agents and effectively restricted a player's
movements and the amount of compensation to which he would otherwise be
entitled.
After a ten week trial, the jury returned a special verdict regarding the NFL's
right of first refusal/compensation system under Plan B. The jury found that the
rules in Plan B: 1) had a substantially harmful effect on competition for the
services of professional football players; 2) significantly contributed to
"competitive balance" in the NFL; 3) were more restrictive than reasonably
necessary in order to achieve "competitive balance" in the NFL; and 4) were the
1. McNeil v. National Football League, 1992 LEXIS 21561 (D. Minn. 1992).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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direct result of the plaintiff's economic injury. The jury, however, only awarded
damages to four of the eight McNeil plaintiffs. One theory as to why the jury
only awarded monetary damages to four of the eight plaintiffs was the jury's
reluctance to compensate already highly paid, successful athletes.
Less than two weeks after the jury verdict in McNeil, Reggie White and four
other plaintiffs brought a class action suit and sought to bar the NFL from
imposing the right of first refusal/compensation system on any veteran football
player whose contract was set to expire on February 1, 1993. However, before
the district court entered final judgment in the McNeil case, the White plaintiffs
reached a tentative settlement agreement. On January 6, 1993, the White
plaintiffs and the NFL entered into a Stipulation and Settlement Agreement
which, inter alia, brought an end to the present litigation. The substance of the
agreement provided that any NFL player with five or more years of experience,
whose contract had expired, would be allowed be negotiate with any NFL team
as an unrestricted free agent during an annual "signing period" which would run
from approximately March 1st to August 15th.4
On February 26, 1993, the district court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement agreement and set a final approval hearing for April 16, 1993. Various
players, one NFL team, and one player agent filed motions objecting to the terms
of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. The objectors did not believe that
the White plaintiffs adequately represented their interests and did not believe that
the settlement provisions were fair to all players. The objectors believed they
could receive more compensation by litigating claims of antitrust violations
individually, rather than through a class action settlement negotiation.
Legal Analysis
Initially, in order to determine whether the Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement was acceptable, the district court employed the two-stage process
from the Manual for Complex Litigation.5 According to the manual, a court
must determine: 1) whether the settlement is "within the range of possible
approval" and 2) whether adequate notice and time was given to class members
to file objections prior to the final approval hearing. On February 26, 1993, the
district court determined that the proposed settlement fell within the range of
possible approval and granted preliminary approval. Consequently, the district
court set April 16, 1993, as the date for final approval.
The district court then determined whether adequate notice and time was
given to the class members. According to Grunin v. International House of Pan-
cakes, the actual procedure of the notice processes are left to the court, subject
only to standards of reasonableness.6 The court noted that the objectors had
nearly five weeks from February 26, 1993, the date of preliminary approval, to
3. McNeil, 1992 Lexis 21561 at "1-2.
4. White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389. 1403 (D. Minn. 1993).
5. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, §§ 30.44 at 241-42 (2d ed. 1985).
6. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1987).
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April 2, 1993, the date of the deadline, to file an objection. Additionally, on
March 8, 1993, the plaintiffs published a notice of the Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement in the USA today. This publication gave objectors nearly four weeks
to file an objection. Finally, on March 12, 1993, plaintiffs mailed a notice of the
class action settlement to all class members. This notice gave objectors three
weeks to file an objection. These procedures alone sufficed to give all class
members adequate notice of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. However,
in February, 1993, the plaintiffs mailed information concerning the settlement
agreement to 670 player agents, who represented over 95% of all players. Also,
on March 1, 1993, the plaintiffs conducted a seminar concerning the settlement
agreement with approximately 175 agents. Lastly, due to intense media coverage,
nearly every major newspaper printed portions of the settlement agreement.
Based on the following reasons, the district court held that adequate notice was
given to class members.
Next, the District Court determined the standard for evaluating the Stipulation
and Settlement Agreement. Although voluntary settlement agreements are
strongly encouraged by the federal courts, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
prohibits settlements of class action lawsuits without court approval. According
to the holding in Van Horn v. Trickey, the primary responsibility of the court is
ensure that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate."7 Several factors
determine whether a settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
These factors include: 1) the strength of the plaintiffs' case balanced against the
benefit to the class members from the settlement; 2) the opinions of the
participants; 3) the complexity, expense, and duration of continued litigation; 4)
the extent of discovery completed at the time of this proceeding; 5) any evidence
of fraud or collusion; and, 6) the plan for distributing settlement proceeds to the
class members.'
With regard to the first factor, the District Court stated that although the
plaintiffs had a strong case in that the jury in the McNeil case found defendants
liable for the improper imposition of the right of first refusal/compensation
system under Plan B, the NFL indicated their intent to appeal. An appeal would
cause both great expense and delay for the White plaintiffs. Also, because the
McNeil case only litigated the right of first refusal/compensation component of
Plan B, the plaintiffs would have to prove the defendant's liability concerning
the other components of Plan B, namely the college draft and the NFL's pre-
season pay policies. Assuming that the plaintiffs could also establish liability for
these components, the plaintiffs would still have difficulty proving damages. This
difficulty was reflected in the McNeil case, where the jury awarded monetary
damages to only four of the eight named plaintiffs. All of these factors
diminished the strength of the plaintiffs' case.
The court then looked at the benefits that the class members received from the
settlement. Free agency enables a veteran football player to offer his talents to
7. Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir. 1988).
8. Holden v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1398, 1407 (D. Minn. 1987).
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the team with the highest contract offer, rather than choosing between accepting
an inequitable contract from his current football team or holding out until he
receives a better contract. Theoretically, if a veteran football player was eligible
for free agency, then another football team could make him an offer. However,
the economic consequences of Plan B inhibited most NFL teams from choosing
this course. The court, however, found that the settlement provided the class
members a radically modified free agency system for veteran players. For
example, players previously restricted under Plan B were subject to both the
right of first refusal and compensation of two first round draft picks. Under the
proposed settlement, most players would only be subject to a right of first
refusal. At worst, players would be subject to the right of first refusal and
compensation of only one first round draft pick. The savings realized by
restricting a free agent to only one draft pick would encourage more NFL teams
to enter into the free agency market. Also, players would become eligible for
free agency after five years experience. Additionally, owners would have to
tender substantially higher offers in order to restrict a player's mobility. Under
the current "Franchise Player" rules, in order to restrict an unsigned free agent,
an owner's offer would have to equal the average of the salaries of the top five
highest paid players at that position.
In addition, the class members would be entitled to monetary damages of
$115 million dollars. Each class member would receive an average settlement of
$100,000. This average was nearly twenty-five times higher than the average
share class members received in a similar lawsuit.9 Based on the numerous
benefits which class members would receive under the Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement, and the uncertainty of plaintiffs' success if litigation continued, the
district court determined that the proposal was fair, reasonable, and adequate.
The court also found that over 98% of class members as well as class counsel
supported the proposed settlement. Also, the district court found that this
settlement was the product of an arm's length transaction, negotiated in good
faith, by experienced attorneys. Lastly, the court determined that the allocation of
settlement funds were fair and reasonable. The allocation formula was based on a
point system. Players who negotiated contracts after being restricted under Plan
B received more points than players who negotiated contracts before being
restricted.
Finally, the court addressed the objectors concerns that the proposed
settlement violated antitrust laws. According to Grunin, unless the provisions of
a proposed settlement agreement are per se violations of antitrust laws, a court
should approve the settlement.' The District Court then concluded that absent a
full trial on the merits of the case, it was unlikely that the settlement per se
violated any antitrust laws.
9. Alexander v. National Football League, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH), 1977 WL 1497, at *18-19
(D. Minn. 1977).
10. Grunin, supra note 6, at 124.
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Conclusion
Having found the Stipulation and Settlement agreement to be fair, reasonable,
and adequate, the district court overruled all objections to the settlement and
gave its final approval to the settlement. Thus, the settlement provided a
modified free agency system for veteran football players as well as settlement
payments averaging roughly $100,000 per class member.
James G. McCarthy
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